The Year 1915 Illustrated/The Dardanelles and Gallipoli

HEN the complete history of the war comes to be written there is little doubt but that the two separate attacks by the Allies on the Dardanelles will form one of the most awe-inspiring chapters. The entry of the Turks into the war constituted the attack a political and military necessity, and it was pressed forward by the Allies in the face of the greatest obstacles and dangers, with the utmost audacity and heroism. The first serious attack was a naval one. On February 20th the Admiralty issued a notification that a British fleet of battleships, accompanied by flotillas and aided by a French squadron, the whole under the command of Vice-Admiral Sackville H. Carden, had bombarded the forts at the entrance to the Straits. In the following weeks the attack was pushed as far as Chanak at the Narrows, where the difficulties of the situation became more and more apparent. On March 18th, two British battleships, HMS Irresistible and Ocean, and one French battleship, Bouvet, were sunk by floating mines in the Straits.

Previous to this mishap the Allies had been convinced of the necessity of the support of land forces for the naval squadrons engaged, but it was not until five weeks later, on April 25th, that a landing was effected on the Gallipoli peninsula by British, Australian and New Zealand troops, supported by the French. The story of this landing has been told in a memorable dispatch from General Sir Ian Hamilton, published on July 6th. Stupendous difficulties had to be overcome, owing to bad weather and the restricted area of the possible landing places. Moreover, the unexpected delays had enabled the Turks to consolidate their forces in a strong position to defend the heights which command the Dardanelles. Thus when the landing was effected, the invading force met with the most strenuous opposition, and the fighting soon settled down to trench warfare of the most desperate character.

Some idea of the difficulties encountered in the actual landing may be gathered from the following extracts from Sir Ian Hamilton's famous dispatch, referred to above.

Sir Ian Hamilton's Dispatch
After describing how he had carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, Sir Ian gives some account of the physical features of the coast, and then proceeds:

The result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have described — a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such attempt, — involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history, except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attacks which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable, if awkward, contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the force.



The covering force of the 29th Division left Mudros Harbour on the evening of the 23rd April for the five beaches, S, V, W, X, Y. The detachment detailed for S beach effected a successful landing at the cost of some fifty casualties. But it was far otherwise with the troops who attempted the landing on Y beach, which consisted merely of a narrow strip of sand at the foot of a crumbling scrub-covered cliff some 200 feet high immediately to the west of Krithia. A number of small gullies running down the face of the cliff facilitated the climb to the summit, and so impracticable had these precipices appeared to the Turks that no steps had been taken to defend them. . . . Both battalions were able, in the first instance, to establish themselves on the heights, reserves of food, water and ammunition were hauled up to the top of the cliff, and in accordance with the plan of operations, an endeavour was immediately made to gain touch with the troops landing at X beach. Unfortunately the enemy's strong detachment from Y, interposed, our troops landing at X were fully occupied in attacking the Turks immediately to their front, and the attempt to join hands was not persevered with. The troops at Y beach had ultimately to be withdrawn, which was successfully carried out, although severe losses were suffered, previous to the order being given, by the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth (Marine) Battalion, Royal Naval Division, the troops which had taken part in the enterprise.

The landing at V Beach
The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the following lines: As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the Fleet, three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier River Clyde (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details. The River Clyde had been specially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gang-plank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters, which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows had reached land the River Clyde was to be run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.



As often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite correspond with the intentions of the Commander. The River Clyde came into position off Sedd ul Bahr in advance of the tows, and, just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and the collier were approaching the landing-place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crew suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the farther side. None of the boats, however, were able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach.

Now came the moment for the River Clyde to pour forth her living freight but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation began.

Space will not permit of further extracts from Sir Ian Hamilton's dispatch. The difficulties only commenced when the actual landing had been effected, for the Turks were everywhere strongly entrenched and resisted every yard of advance. On May 18th a misfortune befell the fleet which was assisting the land operations, HMS Goliath being torpedoed by Turkish destroyers, and two weeks later two more capital ships, HMS Triumph and HMS Majestic, met a similar fate. These losses magnified the difficulties of the enterprise upon which the Navy was engaged in these waters. As against this, two British submarines, the E II, under the command of Lieut.-Commander M. E. Nasmith, and E14, under Lieut.-Commander Edward Courtney Boyle, R.N., were reported to have carried out some brilliant feats in the Sea of Marmora, where numerous transports of the enemy had been sunk and warships damaged. Both these gallant officers were awarded the V.C. for their achievements.



On June 6th official news was published of the results of a general attack by the land forces two days previously. Five hundred yards had been gained along a front of three miles and the positions had been consolidated. Advances continued to be made, in spite of the fact that every yard of ground was stubbornly defended by the Turks. On July 4th the Turks made a great effort to drive the Allies into the sea, which resulted, after tremendous fighting, in victory for the Allies. By this date the casualties to the British forces in the Dardanelles had amounted to over 44,000 men, losses greater than those suffered by the Empire during the whole period of the Boer War.

The month of August witnessed a further landing by the British at Suvla. This landing was carried out with great secrecy, but, unfortunately, the advance from this quarter was held up by the Turks after only slight progress had been made. The fighting which took place the day after the landing was of the most desperate character, and during the week which followed terrible losses were inflicted on both defenders and invaders. On August 28th some further advance was made, but generally the progress continued very slow, whilst the losses by wounds and disease mounted up at an alarming rate. Meantime British submarines in the Sea of Marmora continued to harass the Turks, sinking transports and making it difficult to convey supplies to the peninsula. In the Ægean a German submarine scored the first real success against the British transport service, the Royal Edward, a famous Canadian liner, being sunk with the loss of about one thousand lives. Up to the 26th of October, British submarines in the Sea of Marmora had succeeded in sinking or damaging two battleships, five gunboats, one torpedo boat, eight transports, and 197 supply ships of all kinds.

Later developments
The hardening of the situation in the Balkans during the months of September and October, coupled with the great losses and lack of success of the Allies in Gallipoli, has resulted recently in much criticism and questioning as to the final outcome of the Dardanelles expedition. Speaking in the House of Commons on November 2nd on the general situation in Gallipoli, Mr. Asquith confessed that "in the whole course of the war, with its ups and downs, I have never sustained a keener disappointment than in the failure of this operation. The chances of success, as it seemed to us and to those on the spot, were not only great, but preponderant. The consequences of success, if success had been attained, were almost immeasurable."

Mr. Asquith did not finish on this pessimistic note. He indicated that it was too soon to pass a final judgment. His concluding words were: "The situation at the Dardanelles is receiving our most careful and anxious consideration, not as an isolated thing, but as part and parcel of a far larger strategic question which is raised by the whole of the recent developments in the Eastern theatre of war."